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Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union:
First Amendment Free Speech Guarantee
Extended to the Internet

In Reno u. American Civil Liberties Union,' the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of two provisions of the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA") of 1996.2 At issue was the
validity of the "indecent" transmission and "patently offensive" display
provisions of the CDA that attempted to regulate Internet content with
the objective of protecting minors from harmful material. The Court
struck down both provisions as violative of the First Amendment right
to free speech.'
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Internet "represents the new frontier for unparalleled freedom of
expression whose content "is as diverse as human thought."' Worldwide, almost ten million host computers link to the Internet, and
Congress predicts that the number of Internet users will grow from over
forty million today to two hundred million by 1999.6 The CDA repre-

sents the government's first attempt to substantially regulate content on
the Internet. On February 8, 1996, after overwhelming support in both
Houses, President Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.' Title V of the Telecommunications Act includes provisions of
the CDA.'
Specifically, one provision, 47 U.S.C.A § 223(a)(1)(B),

1. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
2. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West 1997)).
3. 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
4. Michael Johns, The FirstAmendment and Cyberspace:Trying to Teach Old Doctrines
New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (1996).
5. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Penn. 1996).
6. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
7. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
8. The relevant provisions of the CDA include 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (West 1997):
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proscribes the knowing transmission of "obscene or indecent" material
to a person under the age of eighteen years.9 A second provision, 47
U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B), disallows knowingly sending or displaying
"patently offensive" materials that pertain to "sexual or excretory
activities or organs" to anyone under eighteen years of age."0 On the
day the CDA was signed into law, the first of two separate law suits was
filed by forty-seven plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the CDA's "patently
offensive" display and "indecent" transmission provisions." Plaintiffs,
(a)... Whoever-(1) in interstate or foreign communications- . . (B) by means
of a telecommunications device knowingly-(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii)
initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image,
or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient
of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker
of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication; ... (2)
knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used
for any activity prohibited in paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such
activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
Id. The relevant portion of 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (West 1997) provides the following:
(d) ... Whoever-(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-(A) uses
an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18
years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to persons under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or (2) knowingly permits
any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an
activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such
activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
Id. The CDA also provides two affirmative defenses.
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) of this section,
or under subsection (a02) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for an
activity under subsection (a)(1XB) of this subsection that a person--(A) has taken,
in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such
subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from
such communications, including any method which is feasible under available
technology; or (B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use
of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5) (West 1997).
9. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(aXl)(B) (West 1997).
10. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(dXl)(B) (West 1997).
11. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827. For other related litigation, see Shea v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd mem., 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
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represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, were entities and
individuals who made information available on the Internet, such as
Human Rights Watch, AIDS Education Global Information System, and
the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc."2 The district
court entered a temporary restraining order against enforcement of
section 223(a)(1)(B)(ii), the CDA's "indecent" provision. 3 A second suit
challenging the constitutionality of the CDA was then filed by various
Internet service providers, such as The Microsoft Network, America
Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe. 4 After consolidating the two suits,
a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania was convened under the CDA's expedited review
provisions.'
The court, with each judge writing separately, unanimously entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both
challenged provisions of the CDA after making 123 extensive findings of
fact relating to the nature, growth, and use of the Internet."6 Employing an overbreadth analysis, Chief Judge Sloviter held that the
provisions of the CDA were unconstitutional under both the First and
Fifth Amendments. 7 Judge Buckwalter characterized the CDA as "so
vague as to violate both the First and Fifth Amendments."" Finally,
Judge Dalzell, limiting his analysis entirely to First Amendment
grounds, opined that the disruptive effect of the CDA on Internet
communications as well as the CDA's broad reach into protected speech
rendered the act unconstitutional.' The Government appealed directly
to the United States Supreme Court under the CDA's special review
provisions,"0 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.2' In Reno v.
ACLU, the Court invalidated both the "indecent" and "patently offensive"
provisions of the CDA as unconstitutionally overbroad.22
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment dictates that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech.'
Throughout its history, the United

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

929 F. Supp. at 827 n.2.
ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *4 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 15, 1996).
929 F. Supp. at 827-28 n.3.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 830-49, 883.
Id. at 857.

18. Id at 859.
19. Id. at 877-80.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Communications Decency Act § 561; 110 Stat. 142-43.
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
117 S.Ct. at 2351.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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States Supreme Court has consistently evidenced its willingness to
staunchly protect the right to free speech. However, although the First
Amendment appears to speak in absolutist terms,24 the Court has never
adopted this approach. Rather, case law provides limited instances in
which the Court has deemed certain speech outside the ambit of First
Amendment protection. The Court has adopted a view that seeks to
strike a balance between individual rights and the good of the community."
This has been accomplished by raising the level of judicial
scrutiny for speech the Court deems worthy of First Amendment
protection. The overbreadth doctrine represents one approach the Court
employs to protect free speech. This doctrine provides that because of
the importance of the free speech guarantee, even when the government
does have the power to regulate an area, it must exercise that power
carefully to avoid unduly infringing on a protected freedom in achieving
a permissible end.26 Resembling the overbreadth doctrine is the void
for vagueness doctrine, a device used by the Court to strike criminal
laws. This doctrine is supported by two rationales. First, vague
criminal laws fail to provide adequate notice to unknowing offenders of
activities prohibited by law.27

Second, these laws are vulnerable to

selective enforcement by officers of the law.s The constitutional
infirmity of laws that are either overbroad or vague is their "chilling
effect" on protected expression; the speaker remains silent rather
than
29
engaging in protected speech that arguably violates the law.
0 the Court struck
In Butler v. Michigan,"
a Michigan law that
proscribed making certain "obscene, immoral, lewd, or lascivious"
material available to the general public.8 The State contended that
the purpose of the legislation was to protect children against deleterious
material tending to corrupt the morals of youth. 2 This purpose, the

24. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
25. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961). See also Farber & Nowak,
JusticeHarlanand the FirstAmendment, 2 CONsT. COMMENTARY 425 (1985).
26. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
27. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991) (holding that a state
bar rule preventing a lawyer from making any statement having "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding, was void for vagueness); Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state statute criminalizing "subversive
activities" for vagueness).
28. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking state statute requiring
loiterers to account to law enforcement officers).
29. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 494.
30. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
31. Id. at 381.
32. Id. at 383.
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State asserted, could be achieved by "quarantining the general reading
The
public against books not too rugged for grown men and women.'
Court rejected this assertion, characterizing the effect of the statute as
"burn[ing] the house to roast the pig." 4 Although the Court accepted
that protecting minors from obscene material was a valid state interest,
it held that the fallacy of the statute was that it was "not reasonably
A state cannot
restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal.'
"reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children."' Subsequently, in Ginsberg v. New York, 37 the Court held that
a state may prohibit the distribution of sexually explicit materials to
children even though those materials would not be obscene if distributed
to adults.' Under consideration was a state criminal obscenity statute
that, unlike the blanket prohibition in Butler, disallowed the sale of
obscene materials to persons under the age of seventeen years.39
Noting that the First Amendment does not afford protection to obscenity,' the Court reasoned that the State's interest in safeguarding the
well-being of its children was within its constitutional power.4 1
Accordingly, the Court unequivocally rejected the contention that the
availability of sexually explicit material "cannot be made to depend upon
whether the citizen is an adult or a minor."4 Further, because the
statute in question did not prevent the sale to adults of materials not
obscene to them, it was distinguishable from4 the prohibition invalidated
by the Court eleven years earlier in Butler. 3
After a string of cases that obviated the Court's difficulty in applying
its definition of "obscenity" formulated in Roth v. United States,44 the
Court in Miller v. California' provided an expanded three-prong test
for obscenity. A state may proscribe obscene material if: (1) "'the
average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
38. Id. at 643.
39. Id. at 631.
40. Id. at 635 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). Roth defined
"obscenity" as "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest." 354 U.S. at 489.
41. 390 U.S. at 639.
42. Id, at 636.
43. Id. at 634-35.
44. 354 U.S. at 489.
45. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest";4 (2)
"the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law"; 4' and (3) "the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.'
The Court emphasized, through the "specifically
defined" requirement, that state statutes designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited.49
Six years later, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation," a sharply divided
Court upheld the power of the FCC to regulate, in limited circumstances,
a radio broadcast that was "indecent" but not "obscene" in the constitutional sense."' A plurality of the Court addressed the constitutionality
of the FCC's proscription against broadcasting "indecent"62 speech. The
Court qualified its holding that the FCC could constitutionally prohibit
the broadcast of "indecent" speech by remarking that "each medium of
expression presents special First Amendment problems." Further, the
broadcasting media has received the "most limited First Amendment
protection" due to its distinct characteristics.5 " First, the broadcast
media has established a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans.", Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in
and out, indecent material presented over the airwaves "confronts the
citizen ... in the privacy of the home" so that the listener cannot be
protected from "unexpected program content.'s Second, the fact that
broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, coupled with the fact
that the state has an interest in the "'Well-being of its youth,'" justifies
the special treatment of indecent broadcasting.57 Most significant was

46. Id. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 23-24. The Court cited as an example of how a statute could satisfy the
"specifically defined" requirement: "[platently offensive representation or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id. at 25.
50. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
51. Id. at 744-51. Early one weekday afternoon, a radio station broadcasted twelve
minutes of monologue by satirist George Carlin. During this monologue, Carlin repeatedly
used various words referring to sexual and excretory activities and organs. After receiving
a complaint from a listener who claimed that he had heard the broadcast while driving
with his young son, the FCC issued a declaratory order holding that the radio station could
have been subject to "administrative sanctions." Id. at 729-30.
52. Defined by the Court as "nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." Id.
at 740.
53. Id. at 748.
54. Id
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640).
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the plurality's statement that "indecency is largely a function of
context,"5 8 and that accordingly, a "broadcast of patently offensive
words dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its
content."59 Time of day, mode of transmission, and the nature of the
program are considerations that are taken into account.'e Finally, the
Court stressed the "narrowness" of its holding: an occasional expletive
in an Elizabethan comedy most likely would not warrant criminal
prosecution."'
The goal of protecting children cannot justify the suppression of
constitutionally protected but indecent speech. This principle, already
announced by the Court in Butler and Ginsberg relating to printed
materials, was extended in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.(2 to
yet another medium-unsolicited commercial advertisements about
contraceptives mailed to homes. In Bolger the Court struck a federal
criminal statute that prohibited the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive
advertisements.' The Government asserted two interests: to shield
the recipients of mail from material they may find offensive and to aid
parents' efforts to discuss birth control with their children." The first
interest carried little weight; the fact that protected speech may be
The second
offensive to some does not justify its suppression."
interest, although "undoubtedly substantial," was not sufficiently
furthered by the statute." Citing the pronouncement in Butler that the
government may not "'reduce the adult population.., to reading only
what is fit for children,' 0 7 the Court wrote that "the level of discourse
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be
Finally, the Court distinguished Pacifica
suitable for a sandbox.'
because unlike the broadcast media, which is uniquely invasive, the
"receipt of mail is far less intrusive and uncontrollable.' Additionally,

58. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 745. This statement marks a discomforting change from traditional First
Amendment theory, which subjects any type of content regulation to exacting judicial
scrutiny. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). The effect of the
plurality's holding was to permit five Justices to decide the degree of protection speech
would be afforded based upon their own assessment of the speech's social value.
60. 438 U.S. at 750.
61. Id.
62. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
63. Id. at 61-62, 75.
64. Id. at 71.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 73.
67. Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
68. Id. at 74.
69. Id.
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the special interest of the government in the regulation of the broadcast
media "does not readily translate into a justification for regulation of
other means of communication."7
The Court has distinguished between content-based and contentneutral restrictions on speech.7 ' A content-based restriction attempts
to suppress speech because of the message it conveys; a content-neutral
restriction on speech is concerned with the secondary effects of speech
and is justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.7" A content-based restriction is valid only if it fits within a
category of speech, such as obscenity, that the First Amendment does
not protect.7 Otherwise, content-based restrictions are subjected to the
strictest judicial scrutiny and are presumptively unconstitutional. 4
Conversely, content-neutral restrictions, those concerned with the time,
place, and manner of speech, are subject to lower scrutiny.7"
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,' the Court upheld a
zoning ordinance that prohibited "adult" motion picture theaters from
locating within one thousand feet of any residential zone, single or
multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.77 Because the focus
of the ordinance was the secondary effects, such as the preservation of
the quality of life, associated with the location of adult theaters, the
ordinance passed constitutional muster as a content-neutral restriction
on speech.7" Specifically, the ordinance left available reasonable
alternative avenues of communication; adult theaters could still be
located in more than five percent (or 520 acres) of the City of Renton. 79
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, s' the Court
invalidated a federal statute strikingly similar to the one in Reno. A
federal statute imposed an outright ban on indecent as well as obscene
interstate commercial telephone services, otherwise known as "dial-aporn."8 ' Affirming its holding in Miller, the Court stated that there is

70. Id.
71.

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).

72. Id.
73. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
74. 475 U.S. at 46-47.
75. Id. at 47. Specifically, content-neutral restrictions pass constitutional muster "so
long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication." Id.
76. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
77. Id. at 43, 55.
78. 1I at 47-48.
79. Id. at 53.
80. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
81. Id. at 117-18.
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no constitutional barrier to the ban on obscene dial-a-porn recordings. s2
However, the ban on indecent sexual expression was unconstitutional:
"Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the
First Amendment."' Accordingly, a restriction on indecent expression
can survive only if it promotes a compelling state interest and is the
least restrictive means available to further the articulated interest.'
As in Bolger, the Court went to lengths to carefully distinguish the
plurality opinion in Pacifica. First, unlike the prohibition presented in
Pacifica, this was a total ban aimed at suppressing indecent telephone
messages at all times of the day. Second, and most significantly, the
Court distinguished between the mediums involved in each case. Unlike
the broadcast media, which "can intrude on the privacy of the home
without prior warning as to program content[,] ... the dial-it medium
requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication."' Finally, congruent with its well-settled rule that "the government may not 'reduce the adult population.., to... only what is fit for
children, ' " " the Court stated that the government could not limit "the
content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for
children to hear."'
The final case laying the foundation for the Court's decision in Reno
came in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,Inc.
v. FCC. 9 Television access programmers and cable television viewers
challenged the constitutionality of a federal law that permitted cable
providers to ban programs with indecent ("patently offensive" sex-related
material) content on leased access channels.' Following its decision in
Pacifica,a plurality of a severely fragmented Court upheld the provision,
reasoning that the "uniquely pervasive presence" that cable television
has in American homes, coupled with the government's compelling
interest in protecting children from indecent materials, justified the

82. Id. at 124-25.

83. Id. at 126.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 127.
86.

Id. at 127-28.

87. Id. at 128 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73).
88. Id. at 131. Also relevant is the Court's rejection of the argument that the outright
legislative ban was the least restrictive means to further its compelling interest of
protecting minors. Because the Government had implemented the ban before testing the
effectiveness of various restrictive measures available to it, such as credit-card verification
or adult access codes, the Government's contention that the total ban was the least

restrictive means was debilitated. Id. at 128-30.
89.

116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).

90. Id. at 2381.
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restriction on indecent programming."' Relying on the well-settled
principle that a legislature may not limit the adult population to viewing
material that is appropriate only for minors, the Court postulated that
the fact that "[nlo provision ... short of an absolute ban ... offer[s]
certain protection against assault by a determined child" does not justify
declaring the challenged law unconstitutional."2

III. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
In Reno the Supreme Court, in a nearly unanimous decision,
invalidated the "indecent" and "patently offensive" provisions of the
CDA.93 Although acknowledging the Government's important interest
in protecting children from harmful material," the Court determined
that the CDA's provisions could not pass constitutional muster because
their facial overbreadth and vagueness rendered them violative of the
First Amendment free speech guarantee."
After summarizing the district court's factual findings,"c the Court
began its analysis by criticizing the Government's unfounded reliance on
Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Renton. 7 Ginsberg, the Court explained, is
distinguishable in several "important" respects.98 First, unlike the
prohibition under scrutiny in Ginsberg, parental consent to children's
viewing or receiving of material abrogated by the CDA does not prevent
prosecution." Second, the CDA's application is not limited to commercial transactions.'c Third, the CDA's "patently offensive" provision is
not limited by the requirement that the material lack serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 1' Further, unlike the restriction
in Pacifica, the CDA designates whether rather than when it is
permissible to communicate; the CDA's prohibition is not limited to

91. Id. at 2386 (plurality opinion) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748
(1978)). Again, the Court refused to adopt a single standard of First Amendment review
of various mediums of communication: "[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies
(broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single standard, good
for now and for all future media and purposes." Id. at 2385. Rather, First Amendment
jurisprudence is one of "continual development" and should be "applied to new circumstances requiring different adaptations of prior principles and precedents." Id. at 2384.
92. Id. at 2393.
93. 117 S. Ct. at 2351. See supra note 8 for the text of these provisions.
94. 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
95. Id. at 2341.
96. Id. at 2334-38.
97. Id at 2341.
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.
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particular times of the day. Moreover, because the Internet is not as
pervasive in our homes as the broadcast media, a child's risk of exposure
to indecent material is reduced: "[The risk of encountering indecent
material by accident is remote because a series of affirmative steps is
required to access specific material."'02 As the district court had
found, the "odds are slim" that a user would enter a sexually explicit site
by accident.' °3 Finally, the Court decried the Government's assertion
that similar to the zoning ordinance upheld in Renton, the CDA
constitutes a sort of "cyberzoning."'*° Rather, the CDA applies broadly
to the "entire universe of cyberspace." 0 5 Further, because the CDA's
purpose is to protect children from the primary effects of "indecent" and
"patently offensive" speech, it must be classified as a content-based
Having distinguished prior case law, the Court
restriction."°
determined that in order to pass constitutional attack, the CDA must
survive the "most stringent review."'O°
The next portion of the opinion addressed the special attributes of the
Internet that make it more akin to the dial-a-porn medium considered
in Sable rather than the broadcast media at issue in Pacifica."
Recalling that "'[elach medium of expression... may present its own
problems,'" the Court explained how the differences between the Internet
and the broadcast medium justified special treatment for the former.'
First, unlike radio or television, the Internet is not as invasive because
Next, the broadcast
users seldom encounter content by accident."
media has traditionally been subject to government regulation while the
Internet has never been burdened by regulation."' Finally, inasmuch
as the broadcast media was a scarce resource at its inception, no similar
constraint impedes those who wish to communicate over the Internet:

102.

Id. at 2342. See also Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28 and supra text accompanying note

86.
103. 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
104. Id. at 2342.
105. Id.
106. Id. Later in the opinion, the Court rejected the argument that although the CDA
censors discourse in many of the Internet's modalities, it survives constitutional review
because the ability of speakers to engage in restricted speech on the World Wide Web
leaves open ample alternative channels for communication. Id. at 2348. This analysis, the
Court elucidated, only applies to content-neutral restrictions on speech, not to contentbased restrictions such as the CDA. Id.
107. Id. at 2343.
108. Id. at 2343-44.
109. Id. at 2343 (alteration in original) (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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"Through the use of [the Internet], any person with a phone line can
become a town crier [or pamphleteer] with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox.""1 Therefore, the Court concluded
that any restriction on free speech over the Internet is subject to
unqualified judicial scrutiny."'
Next, the Court considered the CDAs vagueness and overbreadth.
Persuaded by the potential chilling effect that overly broad or vague
statutes have on the exercise of free speech," 4 the Court demonstrated
how the CDA's provisions fell foul to the First Amendment vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines. Because the CDA fails to define either
"indecent" or "patently offensive," it left potential speakers uncertain
about the scope of barred communication." 5 For example, speakers
engaging in a serious discussion about birth control practices or
homosexuality cannot confidently assume that they would not be
subjected to up to two years of imprisonment.116 The ambiguity of the
CDA coupled with the seriousness of its criminal sanctions "may well
cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably
unlawful words, ideas, and images.""7 Accordingly, the Court opined,
if a more carefully drafted statute could avoid the CDA's burden on
protected speech, it would satisfy the strict scrutiny standard."'
Turning to whether the CDA is sufficiently tailored to achieve its
objective of protecting children from harmful materials, in light of less
restrictive alternatives available to the Government, the Court
ascertained that the CDA lacks the precision required of content-based
restrictions." 9 First, the Court reiterated that indecent but not
obscene material is protected by the First Amendment. 20 Second,
although the government has an undeniable interest in protecting
minors from harmful material, this interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of protected speech addressed to adults.'"'

112. Id. at 2344.
113. Id.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
115. 117 S. Ct. at 2345. The Government argued that the "patently offensive" provision
was no more vague than the second prong of the obscenity standard formulated by the
Court in Miller. 117 S. Ct. at 2345. The Court shunned this contention, reasoning that
each of the additional two prongs in Miller "critically limit[s] the uncertain sweep of the
obscenity definition." Id.
116. Id. at 2344.
117. Id. at 2345. This fact distinguished the CDA from the civil regulation considered
in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,Inc. Id.
118. 117 S.Ct. at 2346.
119. Id.
120. Id (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
121. Id.
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Citing the entrenched principle that the government may not "'reduc[e]
the adult population ... to ... only what is fit for children,'"1" the
Court explained that indecent material on the Internet cannot be made
unavailable to adults simply because it is harmful to minors. 12 The
Court rejected the Government's contention that the CDA's knowledge
requirement shields adults from prosecution for engaging in adult-toadult communication. In the absence of a viable age verification
process,"2 the size of the potential audience for most messages requires the sender of an adult communication to be charged with the
knowledge that minors will likely view it."2 Further, the Court stated,
the existence of software that screens for adult sites and objectionable
Along the same
messages undermines the Government's position.'
lines, the Court abnegated the Government's assertion that the CDA's
defenses"2 saved it from constitutional infirmity.'28 In conclusion,
the CDA constitutes an unprecedented and unsupportable suppression
of protected adult speech that is not narrowly tailored to further its
objectives.'
As a last resort, the Government proffered two further reasons why
the CDA should be upheld. First, applying the CDA's severability
clause, the Government urged the Court to sever from the statute those
terms it found unconstitutional. 130 Only part of section 223(a) could
be saved by the severability clause. In harmony with its decision in

122. Id. (alteration in original) (quotingDenverAreaEduc.Telecomm. Consortium,Inc.,
116 S. Ct. at 2393).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2347. The district court found that current technology did not include any
effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults. Id. at 2347. Further, with
regard to the World Wide Web, age verification, although possible, is prohibitively
expensive. Ide See also id. at 2349 (further elaborating on the Court's disagreement with
the Government's knowledge argument and fiuther discussing the economic unfeasibility
of noncommercial site publishers to use available age verification software, thus rendering
hollow the CDA's defense of avoiding prosecution where adult verification is used).
125. Id. at 2347.
126. 1d However, as the Court itself noted, this software does not yet screen for
sexually explicit images. Id. at 2336.
127. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5) (West 1997). See supra note 8.
128. 117 S. Ct. at 2349-50. One defense provided that persons employing "good faith,
reasonable, effective and appropriate actions" to prevent minors from obtaining access to
proscribed materials would be protected from prosecution. Currently, the Court noted,
fully "effective" screening software does not exist, and even if it did, there is no sure way
to know whether the recipient would use this software. Id. at 2349.
129. Id. at 2347.
130. Id. at 2350.
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Miller,131 the Court left intact the prohibition against the transmission
of "obscene" material but removed the "or indecent" language it had just
deemed unconstitutional.13 2 Finally, the Court rejected the assertion
that in addition to protecting children from harmful material, the
Government has an [elqually significant" interest in fostering the
growth of the Internet." The fact that Internet usage continues to
surge at a prodigious rate belies the Government's submission that the
existence of material on the Internet harmful to children drives
countless citizens away from the medium.'
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, authored an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part."
Accepting the Government's zoning argument," Justice O'Connor
agreed with the majority's conclusion on the "display" provision, but
parted with the majority's analysis of the "indecent" provision's
unconstitutionality."17 The "indecent" provision should be upheld only
to the extent that it regulates communications between an adult and one
or more minors, such as when an adult sends e-mail to a minor."" To
that extent, the "indecent" provision is no different from the law upheld
in Ginsberg.l13 However, when more than one adult is party to the
communication,
the "indecent" provision falls foul to constitutional
14
attack. 0
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

For the millions of Internet speakers and "surfers" in the United
States (and abroad), the Supreme Court decision in Reno v. ACLU plays
an extraordinary role. They are now able to navigate the Internet free
from the fear of potential incarceration. For example, a parent may now
send to his seventeen year-old college freshman information on birth
control via e-mail."' Even those supportive of government regulation
of the Internet should be content with the Court's decision. The CDA,

131.
132.
133.
134.

413 U.S. 15 (1973). See supra text accompanying note 45.
117 S. Ct. at 2350.
Id. at 2351 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 19).

137.

117 S. Ct. at 2353 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id.
135. Id. at 2351-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
138. I& at 2355.
139. I& See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
140. 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
this instance, Justice O'Connor explained, adults are unlawfully restricted from engaging

in protected speech with one another. Id.
141. Id. at 2348.
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as construed by the Court, symbolized the kind of speech suppression
abhorred by those who have influenced the evolution of this nation.
Over a century ago, John Stuart Mill in his 1859 essay, On Liberty,
recognized the public good and enlightenment that results from the free
exchange of ideas.' 2 Reno further enshrines this basic principle
advocated by Mill and jurists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes.'
Moreover, Reno marks a significant step in the development of First
Amendment jurisprudence. First, it solidifies the Court's eagerness to
protect the free speech guarantee as applied to new modes of expression.
Second, congruent with precedent, it affirms the Court's refusal to adopt
one standard of First Amendment review to all mediums of expression.
Although some argue that the Court should provide one standard of
review, that approach ignores the fact that each medium of expression
is unique and presents its own problems. 1" While the absence of a
fixed standard may leave legislatures somewhat uncertain about
whether and how they should regulate new mediums of expression, this
alone has not and should not deter the Court from applying different
standards each time it is faced with a new instrumentality of expression.
Further, by analogizing the Internet to the telephone medium and by
rejecting the Government's assertion that restrictions on speech on the
Internet warrant the same standard of review applicable to the
broadcast media, the Court has made a solemn proclamation: restrictions
on Internet speech are subject to almost unmitigated First Amendment
judicial review.14 This is made clear in the final paragraph of the
majority opinion: "As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence
of the evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it."'"
For now, parents may ensure that their children are shielded from the
plenitude of sexually explicit material widely available on the Internet
by using software such as Cyber Patrol and Intergo. Clearly, Congress
is free to craft legislation that will protect children while satisfying the
First Amendment. 47 In particular, a narrowly drawn definition of

142. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. II (1859).
143. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(expounding the "market place of ideas" approach to free speech).
144. See Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, BridgingThe Analogy Gap: The Internet,
The PrintingPressAnd Freedom of Speech, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 711 (1997).
145. 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
146. Id at 2351.
147. As of this writing, there are two bills pending before Congress. The first, known
as "ODA 2" in on-line circles, would criminalize material deemed "harmful to minors"
(instead of the "indecent" wording of the CDA). See S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997). Violators
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"indecent" that does not encompass material constitutionally protected
as to adults, together with the availability of more effective screening
software, may provide the conditions necessary to satisfy judicial review.
Until then, Web surfers can enjoy the Internet without bombardments
.
of invitations
to
join
the
Blue
Ribbon
Campaign
for
free
speech
on the
14
Internet.
RAFic H. BARRAGE

would face fines of up to fifty thousand dollars and up to six months in jail. The second,
which has both House and Senate versions, would require schools and libraries seeking
federal funds for Internet access to install software that would block "inappropriate"
material. See S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3177, 105th Cong. (1998). Whether this
legislation will pass constitutional muster in light of Reno is dubious. Critics argue that
current software is crude and many educational sites are inadvertently blocked. Indeed,
Internet debate over the proposed legislation is already raging. See, e.g., <http://www.eff.org>.
148. Comparable to the Red Ribbon Campaign used for AIDS awareness, the Blue
Ribon Campaign was launched by advocates of free speech on the Internet shortly prior to
the CDA's enactment. See <http://www.eff.org>.

